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I. INTRODUCTION
A little secret to make you think:
Why is the crazy stuff we never say
poetry in ink?
—Lyrics from “Tattoo,” by Van Halen1
Who owns the copyright in a tattoo? Can the owner enforce a tattoo
copyright, and if so, what is the scope of enforcement of a tattoo copyright?
These are questions I left unresolved in The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection
for Tattoos.2 In that Article, I asserted that, despite a lack of any reported
decisions, tattoos are copyrightable works. However, I noted that the related
issues of ownership and enforcement are appropriate subject matter for a
separate article.3 This Article is the follow-up to the first Article, a natural
progression in the analysis of the application of copyright law to tattoos.
Courts have yet to address the questions of ownership and enforcement of
tattoo copyrights. Only a few tattoo lawsuits have been filed in the past ten
years and, thus far, no lawsuit involving the enforcement of a tattoo copyright
has gone to trial.
On December 31, 2012, tattoo artist Stephen Allen instituted an action for
copyright infringement against video game marketer and distributor Electronic
Arts Inc. and former National Football League (NFL) running back Ricky
Williams over tattoos inked on Williams’s right and left arms.4 Allen alleged
ownership of the copyrights in the tattoos, and he claimed that defendants
copied, reproduced, distributed, adapted and/or publicly displayed his
copyrighted tattoos on the cover of the NFL Street, Madden NFL 10, and
Madden NFL 11 video games.5 The parties dismissed the case in April 2013.

VAN HALEN, Tattoo, on A DIFFERENT KIND OF TRUTH (Interscope Records 2012).
See Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, 92 OR. L. REV. 129
(2013) (this article was the first of a series of articles to examine the applicability of copyright law
to tattoos).
3 Id. at 131.
4 Complaint ¶¶ 13–16, Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-3172 (W.D. La. Dec. 31,
2012), dismissed (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Allen Complaint].
5 Id.
1
2
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Christopher Escobedo, a tattoo artist based in Phoenix, Arizona, sued video
game developer and publisher THQ in November 2012.6 Escobedo alleged
copyright ownership of a lion tattoo on the right ribcage of professional mixed
martial artist Carlos Condit.7 Further, he claimed that THQ infringed his
copyright when it featured “a computer generated depiction of Mr. Condit,
including an exact reproduction of the Lion Tattoo” in both the UFC
Undisputed 2010 and UFC Undisputed 3 video games.8 Escobedo hopes to
settle his case before it goes to trial.9
On April 28, 2011, tattoo artist S. Victor Whitmill sued Warner Bros. for
infringement of his copyright in the tattoo inked on Michael Gerard “Mike”
Tyson’s face in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.10 Whitmill claimed
that Warner Bros. infringed his copyright based upon the production
company’s unauthorized11 copying of the tattoo onto the face of another actor12
6 Complaint ¶¶ 12, 20, Escobedo v. THQ, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-02470-JAT (D. Ariz. Nov. 16,
2012) [hereinafter Escobedo Complaint], bankruptcy status conference ordered (D. Ariz. June 26, 2013),
sub. nom. In re THQ, Inc., 1:12-BK-133398 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2013) (transferred to
bankruptcy court); Notice of Appeal by Christopher Escobedo, 1:12-BK-133398, 1143 (Bankr. D.
Del. Sept. 9, 2013) Corrected Order Estimating Claim Filed By Christopher Escobedo, 1:12-BK133398, 1093 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 19, 2013) (estimating Escobedo’s unsecured claim at $22,500
and administrative claim at $0).
7 Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 16.
8 Id. ¶ 28.
9 Ira Boudway, Hey, Pro Athletes: Your Tattoo Is Going To Get You Sued, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-09-04/hey-pro-athlet
es-your-tattooed-arms-are-going-to-get-you-sued?campaign_id=DN090413 (noting that Escobedo’s
complaint is now part of THQ’s bankruptcy proceedings); Michael Bathon, THQ Gets Approval of
Liquidating Plan Ending Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-07-16/thq-gets-approval-of-liquidating-plan-ending-bankruptcy.html (noting THQ received
approval from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for plan to liquidate assets).
10 Complaint ¶ 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011) [hereinafter Whitmill Complaint] (tattoo artist
alleging infringement of copyright in tattoo design).
11 The court concluded that the facts were largely uncontested and that “[n]either Tyson nor
Warner Brothers sought approval from Whitmill [to reproduce the tattoo] before either movie.”
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 2, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (filed June 21,
2011) [hereinafter Hearing Transcript]. Further, the court determined that Whitmill had not
granted Warner Bros. a license, implied or otherwise, to “use the tattoo.” Hearing Transcript,
supra, at 4.
12 Mike Tyson appeared in The Hangover and The Hangover Part II. See Verified Answer to
Complaint by Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. ¶¶ 15–16, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (filed May 20,
2011) [hereinafter Warner Bros. Answer] (“Warner Bros. states that Mr. Tyson appeared, with Mr.
Tyson’s tattoo, in the first Hangover movie, as well as in an advertising poster for the first
Hangover movie, and that thousands of images of Mr. Tyson, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, have
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in its motion picture The Hangover Part II.13 Whitmill further claimed that
Warner Bros. infringed his copyright “through its unauthorized copying,
distribution[,] and public display of the Pirated Tattoo in advertising and
promotion for the Movie and by making an unauthorized derivative work—
namely, the Pirated Tattoo—that is based upon and copies virtually all of the
copyrightable subject matter of the Original Tattoo.”14 The parties reached a
settlement, the terms of which were confidential, shortly following the denial of
Whitmill’s motion for a preliminary injunction.15
In a 2005 case, Reed v. Nike, Inc., tattoo artist Matthew Reed sued not only
the advertising agency and athletic footwear and apparel company responsible
for the commercial in which the tattoo at issue appeared, but he also sued the
bearer of the tattoo, former National Basketball Association (NBA) player
Rasheed Wallace.16 This case also settled,17 but it raised complex issues
regarding ownership and enforcement of a tattoo copyright.
The objective of this Article is to address the challenges that the owner of a
copyright in a tattoo will face if the owner decides to enforce her rights in court.
The Article explores the complexities in determining the ownership of the
copyright in a tattoo, mostly due to the fluidity and informality of the process of
tattoo creation. The analysis then moves to infringement of the tattoo
copyright. In order to prove copyright infringement, the copyright owner must
show a violation of one of the exclusive rights of the owner. This Article
examines the rights most relevant to the owner of a tattoo copyright and
considers how the tattoo artist’s choice of medium, the human body, affects
those rights.

appeared in magazines, television and on the internet since February 10, 2003.”). Warner Bros.
admitted that Tyson’s tattoo and the tattoo appearing on actor Ed Helms’ face in The Hangover
Part II are similar but denied that there was any copyrightable expression in Tyson’s tattoo or that
the tattoo on Helm’s face was pirated. Id.
13 See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 1.
14 Id. ¶ 18. While Tyson appeared in both Hangover movies, there were no non-Tyson uses of
the tattoo in the first movie. Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 2, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752
CDP (motion denied May 24, 2011) (Judge Catherine D. Perry noting, “[t]he first movie didn’t do
anything except show Mr. Tyson’s face”).
15 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752
CDP (E.D. Mo. May 24, 2011).
16 Complaint, ¶¶ 4–5, Reed v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005), dismissed,
(D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Reed Complaint].
17 Order of Dismissal at 1, Reed, 3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005) (dismissing the case with
prejudice after the parties reached a settlement agreement).
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Part II of the Article first evaluates how authorship of a work and copyright
ownership are defined and interpreted under the federal copyright statute and
related case law. It then analyzes the various types of authorship and
recommends that the tattoo artist and her customer discuss copyright
ownership in the tattoo prior to affixing the tattoo on the customer’s body.
In Part III, the Article scrutinizes the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
and the challenges faced by the owner of a tattoo copyright in the enforcement
of those rights. This Part also explores constitutional limitations on
enforcement of a copyright in a tattoo on someone’s body.
This Article concludes with a recommendation that tattoo copyright owners
pursue enforcement of their rights in court but cautions these owners that it is
likely that courts will determine that the choice of a human medium necessitates
the diminution of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. While the owner
of a tattoo copyright must accept that some uses of the work will be beyond her
control, especially many uses of the work by the bearer of the tattoo, the
copyright owner should be vigilant in enforcement of her rights against media
companies and other businesses that seek to exploit the value of the work
without the consent or compensation of the owner.
II. OWNERSHIP OF TATTOO COPYRIGHTS
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides several exclusive rights
to the copyright owner of a work.18 The copyright owner has the exclusive
right to, inter alia, reproduce, distribute, display, and create derivatives of the
copyrighted work.19
However, before a copyright can be enforced, a court must first determine
the owner of the copyright.20 Section 201 of the Act states that “[c]opyright in
a work protected under this title vests in the author or authors of the work.”21
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (the reproduction, distribution, display and derivative works rights
are the most relevant to the owner of a copyright in a tattoo, but a copyright owner also has the
right to publicly perform a copyrighted work (which does not apply to a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work) and, in the case of sound recordings, to publicly perform the work by means of
digital audio transmission); see also King, supra note 2, at 132 (as previously concluded in The
Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for Tattoos, tattoos can meet the 1976 Act’s requirements of a
copyrightable work—some tattoos are original, many, if not most, are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression, and, the useful article doctrine does not preclude copyrightability of this type of
pictorial work).
19 17 U.S.C. § 106.
20 Id. § 201.
21 Id. § 201(a).
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There are exceptions to this rule, such as “works made for hire.”22 Further, the
author of a tattoo may transfer the copyright in the work to the customer.23
Section 202 distinguishes ownership of a copyright from ownership of the
work: “Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work
is embodied.”24 When interpreting and applying these provisions to tattoos, it
is apparent that the author of the tattoo is the owner of the copyright, but that
author may not be, and in most cases is not, the person who owns the tattoo
itself. The owner of the “material object” will most often be the client or
customer of the tattoo artist, or the bearer of the tattoo. Thus, the critical
question: Who is the author of a tattoo?
A. OWNERSHIP V. AUTHORSHIP

Congressional authority to enact federal copyright law is limited by the U.S.
Constitution to the protection of the works of “authors.”25 Although the
Copyright Act vests initial ownership of the copyright in a work to the author,
Congress did not define the term “author.” The Supreme Court has defined an
author as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who

See id. § 201(b):
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. A work for hire has been considered as a possible type of copyright ownership for tattoos.
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellectual Property Rights in
Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 105 (2003). However, this
determination of ownership is unlikely in the relationship between a tattoo artist and his
customer. Works made for hire are either prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment or by an independent contractor. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(1) to 101(2) (2012) (defining
works made for hire). The tattoo artist-customer relationship is not an employer-employee
relationship under § 101(1)’s definition of a work made for hire, nor does a tattoo fall within any
of the required, enumerated categories of § 101(2). See generally Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (“In the past, when Congress has used the term
‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”).
23 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 739–40; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (“The
ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or
by operation of law . . . .”).
24 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a).
22
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completes a work of science or literature.”26 Yet, authorship requires more than
the contribution of creativity or originality to a work.27 The author is the
person “who superintended the whole work, the ‘master mind.’ ”28
The nature of the process by which tattoo art is created complicates the
determination of authorship for the work. The author of the tattoo owns the
copyright in it; however, the owner of the copyright may not be the person
whose body is adorned with the tattoo. Ownership of the copyright is distinct
from ownership of the tattoo itself.29
Ownership and authorship become conflated in the context of tattoos
because of the uniqueness of the medium on which the work is affixed. The
concept is easier to reconcile in the context of other copyrightable works. For
example, the ownership of the copyright in a painting is distinct from
ownership of the painting itself.30 The author of the painting itself would own
the copyright in the painting. The original painting itself, however, would likely
be owned by a separate person or entity. Furthermore, a substantial number of
unknown persons or entities could own reproductions of the painting.31
For tattoos, the owner of the physical object is the person to whose skin the
tattoo is affixed. However, is this person also the author of the tattoo art, and
therefore, the owner of the copyright in the tattoo?32 Or could the copyright
owner be another party—the tattoo artist, the tattoo parlor owner, or other
parties who may have a copyright interest in a drawing or other material used to
create the tattoo?33 Or, in some cases, are the tattoo artist and his customer
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
28 Id. (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53, 61).
29 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”).
30 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“Although Ringgold has retained all rights in the copyright in ‘Church Picnic [Story Quilt],’ the
work itself is owned by the High Museum of Art (the ‘High Museum’) in Atlanta, Georgia.”). In
this case, the High Museum held a non-exclusive license to reproduce the “Church Picnic” as a
poster, and the museum sold thousands of those reproductions. See id. Even after the High
Museum’s license terminated, copies of the poster remained available for sale. See id.
31 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (ownership of a copyright in a work is distinct from ownership of an
object in which a work is embodied); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 72.
32 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 202, 201(a) (2012).
33 Jordan S. Hatcher, Drawing in Permanent Ink: A Look at Copyright in Tattoos in the
United States 7 (Apr. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=815116 (concluding there are four potential owners of a tattoo
copyright: “(1) the tattoo client—the art, (2) the tattoo artist, (3) the tattoo parlor owner, and (4)
any third parties with a copyright in a drawing or other material used for a tattoo.”).
26
27
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joint authors of the tattoo, and therefore, co-owners of the copyright in the
work?34
B. TYPES OF AUTHORED WORKS

In order to resolve questions regarding ownership of a tattoo copyright, one
must first determine the author of the copyrightable work. The 1976 “Act
recognizes three kinds of authorship: sole authorship, joint or co-authorship,35
and employer authorship of ‘works made for hire.’ ”36 Thus, a tattoo can be
solely authored, collaboratively or jointly authored, or made under the “work
made for hire” provisions of the 1976 Act.37
1. Solely Authored Tattoos. The claim of sole authorship of a tattoo is likely to
be highly contested not only because of the straightforward application of the
statute—only one individual has authored the work, and therefore, absent the
application of the “work made for hire” provisions of the Act, the copyright
vests with that individual—but also because this classification of authored
works is a zero-sum game. If the client or customer requesting the fixation of
the work to her skin is the author, then she is the copyright owner. The tattoo
artist would then have no copyright interest in the tattoo. If the tattoo artist is
deemed to be the author of the work, by contrast, then the copyright interest
vests with the artist. In light of the collaborative nature of tattoo creation,38 it
will be difficult for a court to find sole authorship of a tattoo in circumstances
34 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole”); see also id. § 201 (prescribing authors of a joint work co-ownership of
copyright in the work). The fundamental requirement of joint authorship “is the intention at the
time the writing is done that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit.”
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing legislative history of the 1976 Act).
In the context of tattoos, this requirement means the tattoo artist and his customer must intend
to combine their contributions at the time of creation of the tattoo.
35 This Article also refers to joint or co-authored works as “collaborative works.”
36 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 116 (3d ed.
Aspen Law & Bus. 2010).
37 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201.
38 A collaborative nature is assumed in circumstances where the client brings a sketch to the
tattoo artist, or describes it to the tattoo artists, e.g., Reed Complaint, supra note 16, as opposed to
the common instance of a client walking into a tattoo parlor and simply choosing a design from
tattoo flash, without significant modification by the client or artist before application to the skin.
See Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 22, at 138 n.7 (defining “tattoo flash” as a copy of a tattoo
artist’s design sold to others for their use); see also infra text accompanying note 46 (citing Matthew
Beasley, Note, Who Owns Your Skin: Intellectual Property Law and Norms Among Tattoo Artists, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1157–58 (2012)).
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where ownership is challenged and the evidence of authorship is weak or
unclear.39
2. Jointly Authored Tattoos. A jointly authored work is defined in the 1976
Act as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”40 The statute also prescribes co-ownership of the copyright in a jointly
authored work; each co-owner has the right to use or license the work, subject
to an accounting to the other co-owners for any profits.41
The 1976 Act does not define the key terms in the joint work definition. As
previously discussed, the Act does not define the term “author.” Further, the
statute does not define the terms “inseparable” or “interdependent.”42 Courts
and intellectual property scholars have proposed various interpretations of the
“joint work” definition, and these interpretations emphasize different parts of
the definition.43 In fact, the Seventh Circuit has noted that the legislative
history of the definition creates more ambiguity than clarification of the

Reed Complaint, supra note 16, ¶¶ 36–37.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
41 Id. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.”); see also
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Childress v. Taylor,
945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991)); Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th
Cir. 1987); 1 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.02, at 6-7 to 6-8
(Matthew Bender, 92d Rev.).
42 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120 (1976) (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if
the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors prepared his or her
contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of
other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.’ The touchstone here is
the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an
integrated unit . . . .”)).
43 Id. at 1068–69 (rejecting Trinity’s “collaboration alone test” as inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the statute and the goal of the Act to promote progress and concluding that, “[e]ven
if two or more persons collaborate with the intent to create a unitary work, the product will be
considered a ‘joint work’ only if the collaborators can be considered ‘authors . . .’ ” which requires
more than the supply of “direction or ideas”); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231–35
(9th Cir. 1999) (“The statutory language establishes that for a work to be a ‘joint work’ there must
be (1) a copyrightable work, (2) two or more ‘authors,’ and (3) the authors must intend their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. A ‘joint
work’ in this circuit ‘requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution’ to
the disputed work . . . . But there is another element to a ‘joint work.’ A ‘joint work’ includes
‘two or more authors.’ ” The Ninth Circuit identifies a number of factors as criteria for joint
authorship, such as superintendence of the work, objective manifestation of an intent to be coauthors, and audience appeal of the work based on both contributions. Id. at 1234. The
Aalmuhammed court notes that control is the most important factor in many cases. Id.).
39
40
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definition.44 Yet, it is clear from the plain meaning of the statute that there
must not only be collaboration of the “inseparable” or “interdependent” parts
but also, from the very beginning of the collaborative relationship, an intent by
the authors to merge these parts.45
It is customary in the tattoo industry for the tattoo artist to collaborate with
the customer in the creation of the artwork that will be affixed to the
customer’s skin.46 Courts have considered two approaches to evaluating
whether one’s contributions to a copyrighted work amount to authorship.47
The first test, proposed by the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer, requires only
that the combined product of the joint contributions be copyrightable (the “de
minimis test”).48 The second test, proposed by Professor Paul Goldstein, requires
that each contribution be copyrightable (the “copyrightability test”).49 While
the majority of courts have adopted the copyrightability test,50 it is not a
44 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068 (“The legislative history states that examples of inseparable parts
are the joint contributions of two authors to a single novel or the contributions of two painters to
a single work; an example of interdependent parts are the lyrics and music for a song . . . . Apart
from these examples, the reports do little to clarify the criteria for determining joint authorship.
Indeed, they increase the ambiguity.”).
45 Id. (agreeing with the Second Circuit’s view that a “disjunctive standard based solely on the
legislative history would not square with the plain meaning of the statute, and therefore, ‘the
statutory language clearly requires that each author intended’ ” to merge their respective
contributions into a unitary whole).
46 Beasley, supra note 38, at 1162 (explaining that some clients seeking to get a tattoo “often
bring in photographs or drawings which they want copied exactly, or from which they want the
tattoo artist to base his or her conceptual framework in creating a new drawing to be tattooed.”
However, other clients “walk into tattoo parlors with ideas and work with the artist to develop
and draw their concepts on paper before the drawing is transferred onto skin.”). Beasley’s brief
explanation of the process of getting a tattoo does not differentiate between a client who brings
in her own photograph or drawing and a client who brings in a photograph or drawing created by
a third party. If a client brings in the former, then this Article posits that the client has
contributed more than an idea to the collaborative process. However, if the client brings in the
latter, then an additional coauthor may be a part of the collaborative process (or the tattoo is an
authorized derivative work of the photograph or drawing, assuming the client has the
author/copyright owner’s permission to use the photograph or drawing), or the resulting tattoo
actually may be an infringement of the presumable copyrighted photograph or drawing. The
challenges posed by enforcement of such tattoo copyrights will be discussed infra, Part III of this
Article.
47 See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069–71.
48 Id. at 1069–70.
49 Id. at 1070–71.
50 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 6.07[A][3][b], at 6-22 to 6-23 (noting that while the
Second Circuit in Childress v. Taylor called the issue concerning copyrightable contributions “open
and troublesome,” dictum in that case rejected Nimmer’s de minimis test and became “the prevailing
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statutory requirement for determination of joint authorship.51 Goldstein’s
copyrightability test has been embraced for its “simplicity and predictability.”52
However, Nimmer grounded his test in his observation that the definition of a
joint work contains no requirement of an independently copyrightable
contribution, nor does the legislative history of the definition address the
copyrightability of the contribution.53
Indeed, the de minimis test may have validity in the context of tattoo creation
between a tattoo artist and her customer.54 In this type of relationship, the
exchange of suggestions concerning the creation of the work between the artist
and her customer is customary and would promote, not inhibit, creativity.55
Further, the de minimis test might better recognize the flexibility and fluidity in
view in the case law”). See, e.g., Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 22, at 105 (concluding that both the
artist and customer would have to “contribute independently copyrightable expression” in order
for the tattoo to be considered a joint work).
51 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 6.07[A][3][a], at 6-22.
52 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s
Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (2001) (citing Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071).
53 Id. But compare 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2,
at 379, ¶ 4:13 (2d ed. 1989) (“A collaborative contribution will not produce a joint work, and a
contributor will not obtain a coownership interest, unless the contribution represents original
expression that could stand on its own as the subject matter of copyright. Section 101’s
definition of a joint work as a work prepared by two or more ‘authors’ implies that the
contribution of each must be a copyrightable ‘work of authorship’ within the term of section
102(a).”), with GOLDSTEIN, supra, § 4.2.1.2, at 379, ¶ 4:14 (“But a collaborator who accompanies
his ideas with original and expressive suggestions will be a joint author even though his
contribution is smaller than the contributions of other authors. Further, it is not necessary to the
creation of a joint work that each collaborator actually fix the work in a tangible medium of
expression.”). See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 6.07[A][3][a], at 6-22 (“[The Copyright
Act] contains no requirement that each contribute an independently copyrightable component to
the product. The legislative history similarly elevates intention as the touchstone, without placing
any further parsing as to the copyrightable status of each individual component that the parties
intend to contribute to the work as a whole.”).
54 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1988), aff’d, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (stating that “[i]f Nimmer is correct on the point that the
contribution of a joint author need not be copyrightable,” then CCNV’s contributions may satisfy
the de minimis test). But see Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070 (“Restrictions on an author’s use of existing
ideas in a work, such as the threat that accepting suggestions from another party might jeopardize
the author’s sole entitlement to a copyright, would hinder creativity.”).
55 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 6.07[A][3][a], at 6-22. Nimmer submits that, in the
motion picture context, “copyright’s goal of fostering creativity is best served . . . by rewarding all
parties who labor together to unite idea with form, and that copyright protection should extend
both to the contributor of the skeletal ideas and the contributor who fleshes out the project.”
This Article asserts that the same policy reasons for rewarding both types of collaborators in the
motion picture industry exist in the tattoo industry.
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the process of tattoo creation.56 The copyrightability test ignores the
significance of the contributions of the customer in most instances, and as a
result of its harshness, treats a collaboratively created work as the solely
authored work of the tattoo artist. While sole authorship, and therefore sole
copyright ownership, may be appropriate in some instances, the rigidity of the
copyrightability test does not recognize joint authorship where the customer is
working with the tattoo artist to create a custom design. While the customer
owns the physical embodiment of the work on his body,57 under the current
interpretation of copyright law, he has no legal rights to the work if he did not
provide copyrightable contributions to it.58 Courts’ current application of the
joint authorship doctrine places courts out of touch with the collaborative
nature of tattoo creation.59
For example, in Allen v. Electronic Arts, Inc., tattoo artist Stephen Allen
acknowledged that the court could find that Williams was the co-owner of the
tattoo on Williams’s left arm, even though Williams signed a “Consent to
Tattoo or Piercing Procedure and Release of Claims” that stated the “artwork
remains property of [Stephen] Allen unless otherwise expressed.”60 Therefore,
as an alternative claim, Allen sought an accounting for any profits realized by
Williams from the exploitation of the tattoo.61
Similarly, in Reed v. Nike, Inc., tattoo artist Matthew Reed met with NBA
player Rasheed Wallace to discuss ideas for Wallace’s tattoo, and Reed took
notes of Wallace’s description of his concept of “incorporating an Egyptianthemed family design of a king and a queen and three children with a stylized

56 Kwall, supra note 52, at 44 (“In light of the current application by the judiciary of the
copyright provision for joint authorship, nondominant authors have little chance of receiving
either personal recognition or appropriate compensation for the contributions.”); Aaron
Perzanowski, Tattoos and IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 535 (2013) (observing that although the
“highly collaborative tattoo design process is highly strongly suggestive of the requisite intent” of
joint authors, “the contributions of most clients are unlikely to meet the threshold of authorship”
adopted by most courts. Further, copyright law would treat most custom tattoos as the solely
authored work of the tattoo artist.).
57 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”).
58 Kwall, supra note 52, at 44 (recognizing that “courts have applied copyright’s concept of
‘authorship’ in a way that evidences little recognition” for the “personal dignity, honor, and
respect” of nondominant authors).
59 Kwall concludes that the courts are out of step with the increasing prominence of joint
authorship in the copyright industries in general. See id. at 62–64.
60 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 8, 28.
61 Id. ¶¶ 26–30.
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sun in the background.”62 Reed made sketches and incorporated Wallace’s
suggested changes into the final drawing.63 Reed then used this drawing and
proceeded with inking the tattoo on Wallace’s upper right arm.64 Thus, the
collaborative creation of Wallace’s tattoo raised the question of whether Wallace
not only owned the physical object tattooed on his arm, but also owned any
copyright interest in the artwork. The settlement of these cases has left
uncertainty as to how joint authorship of a copyright would have been
determined in such situations.65
3. Employer-Authored Tattoos? The 1976 Act includes “work made for hire”
provisions, which provide authorship of a copyrightable work to an employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared.66 Section 101 of the Act sets
forth the definition of works made for hire, and the definition divides works
made for hire into two categories: (1) employee-created works and (2)
independent contractor-created works.67 The statute defines an employeecreated work as one “prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment” and an independent contractor-created work as one “specially
ordered or commissioned” by a person or entity.68 While courts have grappled
62 See King, supra note 2, at nn.18–19 (citing Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright
Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARKE L. REV. 313,
316 (2006)).
63 Harkins, supra note 62, at 315.
64 Id.
65 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES 106 (2010).
66 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless, the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”); see also id. § 101.
67 Id. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is — (1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing
sentence, a ‘supplementary work’ is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a
work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining,
revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements,
answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an ‘instructional text’ is a
literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in
systematic instructional activities.”).
68 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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with interpretation and applicability of the employee category, analysis of this
category, as it applies to tattoos, is rather uncomplicated compared to the
independent contractor category.69
Scholars have previously addressed whether tattoos could be considered
works made for hire.70 A straightforward application of the work made for hire
doctrine to tattoos would be a circumstance in which a tattoo artist is employed
by a tattoo parlor, and therefore, any tattoos created by the tattoo artist may
have been prepared within the scope of the artist’s employment at the parlor.71
However, the more difficult question before a court would be applicability of
the work made for hire provisions to the tattoo artist-customer relationship.
Some scholars have concluded that it is unlikely that a tattoo could qualify as an
employee-created or independent contractor-created work made for hire.72
Others have reached the conclusion that a tattoo could acquire a work made for
hire status in this context.73 This Article agrees with the rationale that tattoos
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989).
Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 22, at 105 (considering several ways in which a work of body
art could be a work made for hire); Harkins, supra note 62, at 324–25 (analyzing applicability of
work made for hire provisions to tattoos).
71 See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751–52 (stating factors considered in
determining whether a hired party is an employee under the common law of agency, including
“the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and
how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party”); see also
Aymes v. Bronelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “the Reid test can be easily
misapplied” because “[the Court] gave no direction concerning how the factors were to be
weighed.” The court then listed factors that “will almost always be relevant and should be given
more weight in the analysis,” including: “(1) the hiring party’s right to control the manner and
means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party.”); see infra note 81; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 5.03[B][1][a],
at 5-14 to 5-17.
72 Harkins, supra note 62, at 324–25 (concluding that a “tattoo would probably not constitute a
work made for hire under either paragraph of section 101.” However, Harkins does not rule out
the possibility that there could be a basis for asserting a work made for hire status for a tattoo in
unusual circumstances.); Perzanowksi, supra note 56, at 534 (concluding that “[c]ustom tattoos are
almost certainly not works made for hire as defined by the Copyright Act”).
73 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 22, at 105 (listing possibilities for a tattoo to qualify as a work
made for hire, such as when a business employs a tattoo artist, when a customer “employs” a
tattoo artist, and when a party specially orders or commissions a tattoo for use as a contribution
to a collective work, arguably an additional tattoo placed on the body of an individual with other
69
70
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cannot be considered works made for hire and finds little support for the
contrary position. Absent the determination of an employer-employee
relationship between an artist and customer, which is highly improbable, a
tattoo cannot qualify as a work made for hire because it will not meet the
requirements of an independent contractor work.
a. Employee Work. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the Supreme
Court interpreted the employee category of the work made for hire provisions.74
In Reid, the Petitioner, a nonprofit association dedicated to raising awareness of
homelessness in the United States, conceived of an idea for a Christmas pageant
display, entitled “Third World America,” to highlight the plight of
homelessness.75 CCNV contacted the Respondent, an artist named James Earl
Reid, to sculpt three human figures as part of a larger display for a Christmas
pageant.76 While the parties discussed several details regarding their respective
responsibilities for the completed work, including a timeline for completion and
costs, they did not discuss copyright ownership of the work.77 Following a
disagreement concerning CCNV’s plans to take the statue on a tour of several
cities to raise money for the homeless, each party filed a certificate of copyright
registration.78 CCNV then filed a complaint against Reid, alleging copyright
ownership of the “Third World America” under § 101, the work made for hire
provision, and seeking to permanently enjoin Reid from infringing upon that
copyright.79 The Court held that Reid was an independent contractor—not an
employee of CCNV.
In reaching its determination, the Reid Court set forth the appropriate test
for interpreting the undefined terms of the employee category set forth in
tattoos); see also David M. Cummings, Note, Creative Expression and the Human Rights Canvas: An
Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 279, 314 (arguing that
tattoos originally created on human flesh should be classified as works made for hire under the
independent contractor provision of § 101 because the tattoo recipient “likely provides some
general idea or vision . . . analogous to that of a hiring party commissioning an independent
contractor to create a work”).
74 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 739–40 (“In the past, when Congress has used
the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe
the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. . . .
Nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions indicates that Congress used the words
‘employee’ and ‘employment’ to describe anything other than ‘the conventional relation of
employer and employe[e].’ ”).
75 Id. at 730.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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§ 101, namely, “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment.”80 The Court concluded that Congress must have meant to
incorporate the established meaning of these terms, and therefore, looking to
the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation and legislative history of the
1976 Act, classification of a hired party should be made with reference to the
common law meaning of the terms under agency law.81 In order to determine
whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency,
the Court considered “the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means
by which the product is accomplished.”82 The Court considered several factors
relevant to this analysis, including:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and the
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the
method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision
of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.83
However, the Court noted that no one factor was determinative of an
employer-employee relationship,84 and that no one factor should be weighed
more heavily in the analysis than another.85
The Second Circuit then refined the Supreme Court’s test for employee
works. In Aymes v. Bonelli, the court determined that some factors are given
more weight than others because they are more indicative of an employment
relationship: “(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party.”86
Id. at 738.
Id. at 740.
82 Id. at 751.
83 Id. at 751–52.
84 Id. at 752 (in light of the circumstances in CCNV, the Supreme Court determined from its
analysis of the factors that Reid was an independent contractor, not an employee).
85 Id.
86 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
80
81
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An analysis of all of the factors under Reid, or under the most significant
factors identified in Aymes,87 would not support finding an employer-employee
relationship between a tattoo artist and her client. Although in many
circumstances a tattoo artist receives considerable input from the client about
the type of tattoo sought by the client, the tattoo artist has a greater right to
control the manner and means of her creation because the artist is the person
actually fixing the tattoo on the skin of the client. This factor seems to weigh in
favor of an employer-employee relationship with the tattoo artist as the hiring
party and the client as the hired party. However, this characterization of the
relationship does not make much sense because the client seeks out the tattoo
artist for a tattoo, not vice versa.
In addition, the other factors do not support the finding of an employment
relationship between the tattoo artist and client. A high degree of skill is
required to fix a tattoo on human skin. “[C]ourts that have addressed the level
of skill necessary to indicate that a party is an independent contractor have held
architects, photographers, graphic artists, drafters, and indeed computer
programmers to be highly-skilled independent contractors.”88 A tattoo artist
possesses a comparable level of skill to perform his work, and therefore, this
factor weighs in favor of finding that a tattoo artist is a highly-skilled
independent contractor. Neither party extends employee benefits to the other
nor pays the other’s payroll taxes. Therefore, both of these factors weigh
heavily against a determination of an employment relationship.89
87 Ryan Vacca, Work Made for Hire–Analyzing the Multifactor Balancing Test, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
29–30 (forthcoming 2015). Professor Ryan Vacca conducted a recent study of all work made for
hire cases since Reid, a total of forty-five cases. For each case, he examined “whether the case
cited Aymes in the context of the five factors Aymes found to almost always be important,” how
frequently the case addressed the Reid factors, and the court’s consistency in the use of a factor to
determine the status of the hired party. Id. at 30–31. Professor Vacca created a continuum of the
work made for hire factors, which grouped together factors based on their relative importance,
i.e., least important to most important factors. Id. at 36. The results of the study revealed that
four of the five Aymes factors were in the two groups on the most important side of the
continuum—all except the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation. Id.
at 39. Vacca found the low importance of this factor to be surprising because the Supreme Court
in Reid suggested that this factor was the ultimate question to be answered, not a factor itself. Id.
Although courts other than the Second Circuit have ignored the importance of this one factor,
courts still treat four of the five factors as some of the most important factors to determine the
status of a hired party. Id.
88 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d at 862.
89 Id. at 863 (“The importance of these two factors is underscored by the fact that every case
since Reid that has applied the test has found the hired party to be an independent contractor
where the hiring party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes.”).
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b. Independent Contractor Work. The other work made for hire category is
works prepared by an independent contractor. The Act defines this category of
work as:
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation,
as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or
as an atlas. . . .90
Therefore, in order to qualify as independent contractor work, the work must
fall into one of the nine enumerated categories. In addition, “the parties [must]
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.”91 While some courts have determined that
the agreement need not use the exact words “work made for hire,” it is clear
that the language of the agreement must set forth this understanding between
the parties.92
Even if the parties agree in writing that the tattoo is a work made for hire,93
a tattoo does not fall into one of the enumerated categories of an independent
contractor work. While it has been suggested that a tattoo could be considered
a contribution to a collective work,94 it is unlikely that a court would accept this
classification of tattoos. Therefore, the “contribution to a collective work”
enumerated category is not applicable to tattoos.95 Absent this classification,
17 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
92 See Eliscu v. T.B. Harms Co., 151 U.S.P.Q. 603, 604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (noting that the
phrase “we engage and employ you” does not necessarily create a for-hire relationship); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 5.03[B][3][b], at 5-14 to 5-17; Armento v. Laser Image, Inc.,
950 F. Supp. 719, 729–30 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (noting that the absence of the term “work made for
hire” in the contract was not fatal when the parties expressly intended that the work be owned by
Laser Image).
93 It is rare for tattoo artists to enter into any copyright agreement with their clients, much less
one that would identify the tattoo as a work made for hire. See Perzanowski, supra note 56, at
534–35 (observing that “signed agreements that contemplate copyright ownership are practically
unheard of in the tattoo industry”).
94 Cotter & Mirabole, supra note 22, at 105.
95 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a collective work as “a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.” Even in instances
where a tattoo is applied to the body of a person who has a number of other tattoos, this type of
contribution does not seem consistent with the illustrative examples in the definition of a
90
91
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tattoos would not fall within one of the independent contractor categories of
works.
C. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Signed agreements concerning tattoo copyright ownership are rare.96
However, in Whitmill, Mike Tyson signed an agreement acknowledging “that all
artwork, sketches and drawings related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of
[his] tattoo are property of Paradox-Studio of Dermagraphics.”97 In Allen,
Williams executed an agreement with broader language regarding copyright
ownership of the artwork.98 While it may be an uncommon practice in the
tattoo industry at present, the discussion of copyright ownership and execution
of an agreement is advisable to clarify any ambiguities concerning ownership of
the copyright interest in a tattoo at the time of its creation.99
The Allen lawsuit troubled the NFL Players Association (NFLPA).100 The
NFLPA has advised players to seek copyright waivers or licenses from their
tattoo artists in order to protect the players, and the union, from liability.101 For
example, NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernik has already secured copyright
waivers from two tattoo artists so his digital avatar can appear in the Madden
NFL 15 video game.102

collective work. Several tattoos may be fixed on one human medium, and they may even be
interconnected. However, tattoos are not “assembled” into one whole work like periodicals or
encyclopedias.).
96 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 534–35.
97 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 7 (tattoo artist alleging infringement of copyright in
tattoo design).
98 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, at 12–13 (the agreement stated: “Artwork remains property of
[Stephen] Allen unless otherwise expressed. All rights are reserved by owner. Any form of
reproduction is prohibited by state and federal [copyright] laws.”).
99 See Meredith Hatic, Note, Who Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and Constitutional Implications
of Tattoos, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 427 (2012) (“Requiring a written
instrument or a contract detailing who owns the work and providing what the subject can do with
the work would eliminate a great deal of confusion in tattoo copyright infringement cases.”); see
also Hatcher, supra note 33, at 21 (“Specific contractual terms between tattoo artists and their
clients can reduce many of the risks of tattoo copyright. Clear, one-person ownership, whenever
possible, would avoid future difficulties.”).
100 Boudway, supra note 9.
101 Id.
102 Ira Boudway, Tattooed Quarterback Colin Kaepernick Got Copyright Waivers To Appear In Video Game,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 5, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-06-05/tat
tooed-quarterback-colin-kaepernick-got-copyright-waivers-to-appear-in-video-game (discussing the
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Tattooing has become more socially acceptable and commonplace in the
United States,103 and tattoos are increasingly visible on celebrities and
athletes.104 Sports have continued to gain prominence and profitability in the
United States, and athletes, and the numerous tattoos they bear, are often seen
in television, film, video games and other media. The prominent reproduction
and display of these tattoos in lawsuits such as Allen increases the likelihood of
tattoo artists going outside the norms of their industry to enforce their rights
against uses by third parties. It is prudent for organizations, such as the
NFLPA, to continue to insist that players seek waivers or licenses from tattoo
artists, in an effort to reduce their potential copyright liability.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF TATTOO COPYRIGHTS
Even if ownership of the copyright in a tattoo is not an ambiguous or a
contested issue, the copyright owner will face challenges in the enforcement of
the copyright. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides several exclusive
rights to the copyright owner.105 The reproduction, derivative works,
distribution, and public display rights are the most relevant to the owner of a
tattoo copyright. In the context of tattoo copyright ownership, these rights are
subject to the defenses of fair use and an implied license.106 In addition,
Thirteenth Amendment107 concerns have been raised in connection with the
copyrightability of tattoos and enforcement of tattoo copyrights,108 and such
NFLPA’s and Electronics Arts Inc.’s insistence that Kaepernick obtain copyright waivers in order
for his digital avatar to appear in EA’s video game).
103 King, supra note 2, at 135.
104 Wendy Haywood, Kent Patrick, Anthony M.A. Smith, Judy M. Simpson, Marian K. Pitts, Juliet
Richters & Julia M. Shelley, Who Gets Tattoos? Demographic and Behavorial Correlates of Ever Being Tattooed
in a Representative Sample of Men and Women, 22 AEP 51 (2012) (conducting telephone interviews of
Australian adults to determine prevalence of and motivations for having been tattooed and
summarizing telephone study of prevalence of tattooing among American adults); Ramin Setoodeh,
Kat Von D: Are Celebrities Driving Tattoo Culture?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.newsweek.
com/kat-von-d-are-celebrities-driving-tattoo-culture-69897 (discussing growth in popularity of
tattoos among celebrities).
105 17 U.S.C. § 106.
106 The exclusive rights of the copyright owner are also subject to a number of limitations and
exemptions, most of which are not relevant to this Article. See, e.g., id. §§ 109(a), 110.
107 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
108 Declaration of David Nimmer, ¶¶ 16, 20, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752 [hereinafter Nimmer
Declaration].
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concerns are addressed below following an analysis of the exclusive rights of
the owner of a tattoo copyright and the defenses to copyright infringement
claims.
A. REPRODUCTION

The right to reproduce a copyrighted work is considered to be the core right
of the copyright owner.109 The reproduction right “encompasses all acts by
which a copyrighted work is embodied in a copy . . . without regard to whether
the copy . . . is used for commercial or noncommercial purposes, whether it is
made for public distribution or private use, or whether many copies or . . . but a
single copy . . . are produced.”110 Unlike the rights of distribution, display and
to create derivative works, further fixation in a tangible object is required in
order to infringe the reproduction right.111
The plaintiffs in Allen, Whitmill, Reed and Escobedo all alleged violation of
their exclusive right to reproduce their copyrighted work.112 In these four
tattoo lawsuits, the plaintiffs were primarily concerned about the copying of
their works by third-party companies—movie production studios, advertising
agencies, footwear companies, and video game developers, for the
commercialization of a product—a film, athletic shoe and video game.113 In
Whitmill and Escobedo, the tattoo bearers were not defendants. In Allen and Reed,
the tattoo artists’ clients were defendants because the plaintiffs alleged their

109 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477–81 (1984) (“Copyright is
based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are
given an incentive to create . . . . [S]uch an extension [to the fair use doctrine] risks eroding the
very basis of copyright law, by depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of
their incentive to create.”).
110 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 53, § 5.1, ¶ 5:9.
111 Id.
112 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 17, No. 5:12-CV-3172 (W.D. La. Dec. 31, 2012), dismissed
(W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2013); Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 17 No. 4:11-CV-752 CDP (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 28, 2011), dismissed (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2011); Reed Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 28, No.
3:05-CV-00198 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2005), dismissed (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2005); Escobedo Complaint,
supra note 6, ¶ 49, No. 2:12-CV-02470 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 2012), bankruptcy status conference ordered
(D. Ariz. June 26, 2013), sub. nom. In re THQ, Inc., 1:12-BK-13398 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2013)
(transferred to bankruptcy court); Notice of Appeal By Christopher Escobedo, 1:12-BK-13398,
1143 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 9, 2013); Corrected Order Estimating Claim Filed By Christopher
Escobedo, 1:12-BK-13398, 1093 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 19, 2013) (estimating Escobedo’s
unsecured claim at $22,500 and administrative claim at $0).
113 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10; Reed Complaint, supra
note 16; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6.
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clients asserted that they had exclusive or co-ownership of the tattoo copyrights
and, in Reed, the plaintiff artist alleged that his client did so with knowledge that
the other defendants would rely upon this representation in the creation of
infringing reproductions.114
Tattoo artists recognize that they have little control over the customer’s
body.115 As discussed in Parts III.D and III.E, tattoo artists expect their clients
to publicly display their works,116 and they acknowledge the prevalence of such
exposure in the tattoo industry.117 The plaintiffs in each of the tattoo lawsuits
conceded that their athlete clients had an implied license to publicly display the
work in order to pursue a livelihood in acting and sports.118 However, the
plaintiffs did not authorize reproduction by their clients and certainly did not
authorize the exercise of this right by third party companies.119 As explained in
Part III.F, an implied license “permits the use of a copyrighted work in a
particular manner,”120 and the copyright owner must have the intent that the
person exercises a particular exclusive right of the copyright owner.121 While
tattoo artists expect a client to publicly display a tattoo on the client’s body (and
the complaints in tattoo lawsuits support this consent),122 it does not follow that
tattoo artists are also granting an implied license to the client to reproduce the

114 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 28; Reed Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 37. However,
plaintiffs acknowledged the possibility of joint authorship of the tattoos, and therefore, coownership of the works. Id. In light of this alternative, plaintiff sought an accounting for his
share of any revenue realized by his client from exploitation of the co-owned tattoo. Id. ¶ 38.
115 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 532 (“Both during and after the design process, tattooers
consistently demonstrate a respect for client autonomy. To varying degrees, client input helps shape
the design of a custom tattoo. And once an image is created on the client’s skin, tattooers uniformly
acknowledge that control over that image, with some limited exceptions, shifts to the client.”).
Tattoo artists’ recognition of the clients’ autonomy in the display of the tattoo should minimize
some Thirteenth Amendment concerns, further discussed infra note 230. See also Perzanowski, supra
note 56, at 530; David M. Cummings, Comment, Creative Expression and the Human Canvas: An
Examination of Tattoos as a Copyrightable Art Form, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 279, 308, 316–17.
116 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 10 (stating that Allen knew Williams was a professional
football player, and therefore, Allen “assumed he would see his art on television”).
117 Reed Complaint, supra note 16, ¶ 14.
118 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10; Escobedo Complaint,
supra note 6.
119 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6; Whitmill Complaint,
supra note 10; Reed Complaint, supra note 16.
120 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).
121 See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010).
122 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 10; Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10; Escobedo
Complaint, supra note 6.
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tattoo in cooperation with third-party companies.123 Such uses are not
acceptable under the norms of the tattoo industry,124 and there is no evidence
that any of the plaintiffs’ in the tattoo lawsuits to date intended to grant an
implied license of this scope to their clients. Tattoo artists disfavor uses of their
tattoos that are disconnected from the body of the tattoo bearer,125 which has
been demonstrated in the tattoo lawsuits to date and is likely to be the case in
the future when third-party companies are reproducing the likeness of a tattoo
bearer or the tattoo itself.
B. PREPARATION OF DERIVATIVE WORKS

A derivative work is defined as:
a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a
translation . . . . fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”126
The language “based upon one or more preexisting works” has been
interpreted to imply that a derivative work must incorporate underlying
copyrightable subject matter.127 In order to be considered a derivative work,
the latter work must contain a sufficient amount of the underlying work to
amount to an infringement of the underlying work.128 The conclusion of the
123 Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1235 (“Implied licenses may be limited and a defendant who exceeds the
scope of an implied license commits copyright infringement.”).
124 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 537 (“In addition to public displays of their tattoos, [tattoo
artists] acknowledge clients’ rights to re-produce images of their tattooed bodies, whether by
uploading images to their Facebook profiles, submitting photos for publication in tattoo
magazines, or even reproducing a picture of the tattoo for commercial purposes. . . . But under
prevailing industry norms, not all client uses are acceptable. Tattooers distinguish between uses
of the tattoo as applied to the body, which are universally accepted, and uses of the tattoo design
as a work disconnected from the body, which are subject to greater skepticism.”).
125 Id.
126 17 U.S.C. § 101.
127 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 3.01, at 3–4.
128 2 id. § 8.09[A], at 8-142.8 (13) n.3 (“There would be infringement only if the pre-existing
work has itself not entered the public domain and has not been licensed for use in the later
work.”).
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first article in this series that addresses the applicability of copyright law to
tattoos, concludes that tattoos are subject to copyright law.129 The copyright
owner of the pre-existing work has the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based upon that underlying copyrighted material. Thus, the owner of a
tattoo copyright has the exclusive right to prepare works based upon that
tattoo.
According to the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the derivative works
right overlaps with the reproduction right to some extent, but the derivative
works right is broader than that right.130 Fixation in a tangible medium of
expression is required in order to create an infringing copy of a work, but
fixation is not required in order to prepare an infringing derivative work.131 In
addition, the derivative works right has been interpreted as picking up where
the reproduction right leaves off—the point at which the contribution of
original material to an existing work creates a new work.132
The plaintiffs in Allen, Escobedo, Whitmill, and Reed all alleged infringement of
their derivative works right,133 and it is possible that the defendants created
infringing derivative works in these cases. It is arguable whether the defendants
added sufficiently original material to the tattoos in the video games in Escobedo
and Allen, the Maori-style facial tattoo reproduced onto the face of another
actor in Whitmill,134 and the digital reproduction of the Egyptian-themed family
tattoo in the Nike commercial in Reed.135 Professors Glynn Lunney and Mark
Lemley provide less protection to derivative users who have made no or little
changes to the underlying works.136 This approach disfavors the uses of the
tattoos in all of the aforementioned lawsuits. In Allen, Escobedo, and Whitmill,
the defendants made no changes to the underlying works.137 In fact, the
defendants’ intentions were to replicate the appearance of the tattoos as closely
King, supra note 2, at 160–61.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
131 Id.
132 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 53, § 5.1, ¶ 5:8.
133 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10; Reed Complaint, supra
note 16; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6.
134 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10.
135 Reed Complaint, supra note 16.
136 Amy B. Cohen, When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 648–49 (1999) (Professors Glynn Lunney and Mark Lemley
argue that the law should be more willing to hold defendants who contribute little to the
“progress of useful arts and sciences” liable for infringement).
137 Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6; Whitmill Complaint, supra
note 10.
129
130
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as possible.138 In Reed, the defendants digitally recreated the tattoo onto the arm
of the tattoo bearer in the television advertisement.139 Again, the purpose was
to recreate the same tattoo, with no changes to it.140 Even if there was
sufficiently original material added to the context surrounding the tattoos, there
was little creativity in their use.
C. DISTRIBUTION

The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right “to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”141 It has been observed that the
distribution right “is unlikely to be infringed in the tattoo context given that
tattoos are fixed upon human skin.”142 This Article disagrees with that
proposition. While a human being (and the tattoo affixed to that person)
cannot be distributed, the person can appear in various media, in which the
work is widely distributed. For example, in Whitmill, the defendant first
reproduced the tattoo onto the face of another actor before distributing copies
of the tattoo in the broadcast of the film as well as promotional and advertising
materials for the film.143 In Allen and Escobedo, the likenesses of the athletes,
which included their tattoos, were digitally recreated or reproduced to appear in
widely distributed video games.144 Thus, while in some cases the distribution
right does not necessitate reproduction in order to be infringed,145 reproduction
in some medium has preceded the infringing distribution of the tattoo in the
tattoo lawsuits to date.

138 Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6; Whitmill Complaint, supra
note 10.
139 Reed Complaint, supra note 16.
140 Id.
141 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
142 Hatic, supra note 99, at 407. Hatic appears to assume that the tattoo is fixed to the skin in the
first instance and infringement of the distribution right would necessitate reproduction of the sketch
or stencil of the design created by the tattoo artist prior to fixing the design on the body. Id.
143 Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 1.
144 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 12; Escobedo Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 47.
145 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 8.12[A], at 8-249.
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D. PUBLIC DISPLAY

A tattoo is a pictorial work, part of one of the eight categories of
copyrightable subject matter set forth in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act.146
Owners of a copyright for a pictorial work enjoy the exclusive right to publicly
display their works.147
The public display right is the most significant limitation on the ability of
tattoo bearers to appear in public with their tattoos in view.148 It is especially
problematic if the tattoo bearer is a celebrity, such as an athlete, music artist, or
television or film actor, because the pursuit of that person’s livelihood depends
on public appearances. Infringement of the public display right would seem
nearly unavoidable. If the tattoo artist is the owner of the copyright in the
tattoo, then he is in a precarious position. One of the ways in which tattoo
artists generate business is through the display of their works to the public.
Tattoo artist Matthew Reed charged Rasheed Wallace $450.00 for an elaborate
tattoo on Wallace’s arm.149 However, Reed expected that the public display of
the tattoo on Wallace—a famous athlete—would generate publicity for his
work and Reed “conceded that such exposure would be considered common in
the tattoo industry.”150 How should copyright law balance the tattoo artist’s
copyright ownership of a work, and the exclusive rights to control the
reproduction, distribution, and display of the work that flow from such
ownership,151 with the unavoidable and often desired display of that work?

146 King, supra note 2, at 160 (categorizing tattoos as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural (PGS)
works and concluding that the useful article doctrine does not preclude copyrightability of this
type of PGS work).
147 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5). Tattoos, like other pictorial, graphic and sculptural works are
capable of being displayed, but they cannot be performed. Hatic, supra note 99, at 408.
148 Hatic, supra note 99, at 408.
149 Harkins, supra note 62, at 316.
150 Id.
151 17 U.S.C. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public . . . (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of digital audio transmission.”).
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Professor Roberta Kwall proposes a solution for balancing a tattoo artist’s
copyright with the inevitable diminution of the exclusive right of display.152
Kwall’s book The Soul of Creativity focuses on the lack of concern for moral
rights in the U.S. copyright system. She analyzes these rights in the context of a
number of copyrightable works, including tattoos.153 Professor Kwall
concludes that “[a] moral rights claim . . . is more complicated in light of the
tattoo being incorporated into the very being of another individual.”154 A
copyright infringement claim is also more complicated for this same reason—
the tattoo becomes a part of the customer’s likeness. As Whitmill testified
during the preliminary injunction hearing of the Whitmill v. Warner Bros.
Entertainment case, his client Mike Tyson was allowed to go anywhere and be
seen anywhere with the tattoo on his face because it is a part of his likeness.155
A tattoo artist who is the sole copyright owner in a work is entitled to control
over use of the work;156 however, the artist has no control over the human
medium.157 Although Professor Kwall acknowledges that Reed’s lawsuit
revealed uncertainty regarding the application of joint authorship law, she
proposes the following resolution when “someone in Wallace’s position
advertises something to which the tattoo artist objects, and the tattoo is a
prominent part of the advertisement”:

KWALL, supra note 65, at 106.
Id.
154 Id.
155 Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 20 (first session, May 23, 2011) (Whitmill’s response to
question by defendant’s counsel regarding Whitmill’s understanding of what Tyson could do with
the artwork tattooed on this face without Whitmill’s approval: “I would have imagined he would
be allowed to go anywhere he wanted and be seen anywhere he wants with that tattoo. It’s his
likeness now. He’s more than welcome to be anywhere he wants to be with it.”). This line of
reasoning raises more intriguing questions concerning a client’s right of publicity in his likeness,
which might include his tattoos. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this Article.
156 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
157 I agree with Professor David Nimmer’s rationale that cosmetic changes to the body itself are
not copyrightable and may raise Thirteenth Amendment concerns; see David Nimmer, Copyright in
the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001) (“Hopefully, any court
presented with such an obscene claim would dismiss it summarily, if on no other basis than the
constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude and other badges of slavery.”). However, I
disagree with (1) the analogy of cosmetic surgery to tattooing and (2) an unqualified prohibition
of copyrightability of tattoos. See Nimmer Declaration, supra note 108, ¶ 16. Unlike surgical
alterations to the human flesh performed by a cosmetic surgeon, a tattoo artist seeks to protect
the artwork fixed on the human body, not the human body itself. Nevertheless, possible
Thirteenth Amendment concerns could result from the tattoo artist’s attempted enforcement of
his rights, which is why I argue that such enforcement is limited in light of the client’s autonomy.
152
153
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Perhaps this situation can be resolved by invoking a type of
public display right pursuant to which the subject of the tattoo
can display the tattoo publicly under the theory that once the
tattoo artist puts her artwork into the public eye by placing it on
another person, she arguably loses the ability to control
subsequent displays of her work by the person wearing the
tattoo.158
Professor Kwall analogizes her proposal to a current limitation on the public
display right of the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. § 109(c).159 Under Section
109(c), the owner of a lawfully made copy of a work, or any person authorized
by that owner “is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than
one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is
located.”160 In the context of tattoos, this means that if a customer purchases a
tattoo from a tattoo artist, then a type of public display limitation similar to
Section 109(c) could be invoked to allow the customer to display the tattoo to
the public without the permission of the tattoo artist. This type of public
display right would significantly limit the ability of the tattoo artist to control
the manner in which his work is displayed. On the other hand, the tattoo
artist’s ability to control the public display of his work is already compromised
in light of the mobility of the medium on which his work is fixed.
While a public display right would protect tattoo customers in Wallace’s
position,161 it would not protect defendants like Warner Bros. in Whitmill. In
that case, defendants took the use of a tattoo artist’s copyrighted tattoo a step
further. Tattoo artist Whitmill sued Warner Bros. for the unauthorized
reproduction of Whitmill’s tattoo, which is displayed on the face of former

KWALL, supra note 65, at 107.
Id.
160 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
161 It appears that Professor Kwall’s proposed public display right is broader than § 109(c), and
therefore, it would also shield the corporate defendants in Reed v. Nike, advertising agency Weiden
& Kennedy and footwear company Nike, Inc. Section 109(c) does not protect transmissions of
the copyrighted work, but Professor Kwall does not suggest a similar limitation for tattoo bearers’
subsequent displays of a work. In fact, she asserts that tattoo bearers should be able to publicly
display their tattoos in advertisements without fear of an infringement suit. Similarly, this Article
posits that the public display right of tattoo bearers should be broader than the current limitation
set forth in § 109(c).
158
159
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heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson, onto the face of another actor162 in
its motion picture The Hangover Part II.163 Whitmill further claimed that Warner
Bros. infringed his copyright through the creation of this derivative work, and
the distribution and public display of the derivative tattoo in the advertisement
and promotion of the movie.164 It is notable that Whitmill did not sue Tyson
for appearing in the first “Hangover” movie or the sequel. Professor Kwall’s
proposed limitation on the public display right would provide an exemption for
Tyson’s appearance in the film, not Warner Bros.’ reproduction of Tyson’s
tattoo on the face of another actor in the film.
E. FAIR USE

In Whitmill, Judge Catherine D. Perry denied tattoo artist S. Victor
Whitmill’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the release of the motion picture The
Hangover Part II.165 During the preliminary injunction hearing, she cursorily
rejected “Warner Bros.’ fair use and parody arguments, noting Warner Bros.
reproduction of Whitmill’s tattoo ‘did not comment on the artist’s work or have
any critical bearing on the original composition. There was no change to this
tattoo or any parody of the tattoo itself.’ ”166 Judge Perry also suggested that
Warner Bros.’ use of another tattoo could have accomplished the same purpose
as the use of the allegedly infringing tattoo.167

162 Mike Tyson appeared in THE HANGOVER and THE HANGOVER PART II. See Warner Bros.
Answer, supra note 12, ¶¶ 15–16: Warner Bros. states that Mr. Tyson appeared, with Mr. Tyson’s
tattoo, in the first Hangover movie, as well as in an advertising poster for the first Hangover
movie, and that thousands of images of Mr. Tyson, with Mr. Tyson’s tattoo, have appeared in
magazines, television and on the internet since February 10, 2003. Id. Warner Bros. admitted
that Tyson’s tattoo and the tattoo appearing on actor Ed Helms’s face in The Hangover Part II are
similar but denied that there was any copyrightable expression in Tyson’s tattoo or that the tattoo
on Helms’s face was pirated. Id.
163 See Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 1.
164 Judge Perry found that Whitmill had shown irreparable harm if Warner Bros. sequel was not
enjoined because Whitmill had “lost control over the image he had created, and a good example
of that was the 7-Eleven promotion, where the image itself was being used to signify something,
and he had no compensation, no right to stop that, no right to control it.” Hearing Transcript,
supra note 11, at 6.
165 King, supra note 2, at 141 (citing Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 3).
166 Id. at 141–42 (citing Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 4).
167 Id. at 142 (citing Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 4).
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Whitmill is the only tattoo lawsuit to consider the issues of fair use or
parody.168 Fair use provides an affirmative defense to infringement for “the fair
use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research.”169 The Supreme Court has
held that parody may be a fair use within the meaning of § 107 of the Copyright
Act.170 Parody is defined as, inter alia, a “literary or artistic work that imitates
the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule.”171
The parodic nature of a work significantly impacts the analysis of the four
fair use factors set forth in § 107: (1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.172 For example, in Campbell, a case in which rap group 2
Live Crew wrote, recorded and distributed the song “Pretty Woman,” an
alleged parody of the song “Oh, Pretty Woman,” a rock song written by Roy
Orbison and William Dees, the Court noted that the Court of Appeals properly
168 Parody seems inapplicable in the other tattoo lawsuits to date; however, the defense of fair
use could have been raised in other lawsuits had they proceeded.
169 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
170 King, supra note 2, at 141, n.70 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594).
171 Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580) (“Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as
a ‘literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic
effect or ridicule,’ or as a ‘composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of
thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them
appear ridiculous.’ ”).
172 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Professor David A. Simon proposes a different test in order to
determine whether a parody is fair use. He asserts that the Reasonable Perception Test (RPT)
should be used to determine whether the parodic character of the work can be reasonably
perceived. David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
779, 781.
“Reasonably perceiving” a parody requires that the following can reasonably be
perceived: (1) the work comments, at least in part, on the underlying work’s
substance or style; (2) the work does not use the underlying work merely as a
vehicle to comment on society generally; and (3) the work is not used merely to
garner attention or (4) to avoid the effort required to create something new.
Id. at 786. Professor Simon argues that the scope of the parody doctrine should be refocused to
include “not only parodies that comment on the underlying work, but also parodies that
comment on individuals’ associations with it.” Id. at 816. While I disagree with a proposal to
abandon the fair use factors, even in cases of parody, Warner Bros.’ use of the copyrighted tattoo
in The Hangover Part II would fail the RPT because, as discussed below, it fails the first two factors
of the test, which are the “heart of the parody inquiry.” Id. at 786.
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assumed that 2 Live Crew’s song contained parody commenting on and
criticizing the original work, but found that it erred in giving virtually dispositive
weight to the commercial nature (factor one) of that parody by way of a
The Supreme Court also rejected the lower court’s
presumption.173
presumption of market harm (factor four) when it analyzed whether 2 Live
Crew’s parody was a transformative174 and, thus, a fair use of “Oh, Pretty
Woman.”175
During the preliminary injunction hearing, the Whitmill parties discussed the
applicability of the Campbell case.176 In response to Judge Perry’s request that
Warner Bros.’ counsel explain the parody in The Hangover Part II, counsel
responded:
Well, sure. You have got this powerful figure, Mike Tyson, in the
original film with the tattoo on his face. What does he do? He
knocks someone out when he is angry at them. He is the
epitome of male aggression. Instead, now you have this milk toast
character with the same tattoo on his face. It’s a real spoof on
men and their misadventures.177
Judge Perry replied:
Yeah, I get that. I thought you had to have something that was
parodying or commenting on the actual copyrighted thing. They
are not saying they have got a copyright on men and their stupid
behavior, and so how is this parody with regard to the tattoo?178
Judge Perry correctly identifies a critical obstacle to the success of the
parody defense in a case like Whitmill. In Campbell, the Supreme Court drew a
distinction between parody, which may be protected under the fair use defense,
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
The Court defines the transformative nature of a work, which is the “central purpose” of the
first factor inquiry, as “whether the new work ‘merely supersedes’ the objects of the original
creation, ‘supplanting’ the original, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.” Id. at 579
(citation omitted).
175 Id. at 594.
176 Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 57 (Warner Bros.’ counsel argued that under Campbell,
“if there is a colorable claim for fair use no injunction should issue”).
177 Id.
178 Id.
173
174
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and satire, which is not protectable: Parody needs to mimic an original to make
its point, “and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or its
collective victims’) imagination,” whereas satire can stand on its own two feet
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.179 As defendant’s
counsel explains, the use of the tattoo is actually a satire of men’s behavior,
specifically the masculinity and aggression of Mike Tyson, the bearer of the
copyrighted tattoo, and the other movie character’s lack of these qualities.
In addition, counsel’s explanation raises the issue of whether the tattoo itself
is the subject of the commentary, or whether the subject is actually Mike Tyson.
The plot of The Hangover Part II, as well as counsel’s explanation of the use of
the tattoo in the movie, both support a finding of the latter.180 If a character in
the movie is the true subject of the commentary, and the use of the tattoo is
incidental or irrelevant to that commentary, then such use is not fair use.181
Defendant’s counsel also concedes that the same tattoo on Mike Tyson’s
face is used on the face of another actor in the movie.182 Judge Perry is critical
of the parody defense because no changes were made to the tattoo.183 Factor
three asks whether “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, . . . are reasonable in relation to the
purpose of the copying.”184 According to the Supreme Court, this factor hinges
on the “persuasiveness of a parodist’s justification for the particular copying
done, and the enquiry will harken back to the first of the statutory factors
[because the Court] recognize[s] that the extent of permissible copying varies
with the purpose and character of the use.”185 Further, factor three “tend[s] to
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.
After watching the movie, I would assert that the subject of the commentary is Mike Tyson.
Further, I posit that Warner Bros. chose to reproduce the tattoo on the face of another actor
because the tattoo now conveyed qualities associated with Mike Tyson’s likeness (now a face
adorned with a tattoo), such as aggression, masculinity and strength. The use of this tattoo raises
issues regarding the overlap of a tattoo artist’s rights in the copyright and a celebrity’s right of
publicity. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
181 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (“If . . . the commentary has no critical bearing on the
substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in
borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors,
like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.”).
182 Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 69–70.
183 King, supra note 2, at 141–42 (citing Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 4).
184 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)).
185 Id. at 586–87 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50
(1984) (reproduction of entire work does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a
finding of fair use as to home videotaping of television programs)).
179
180
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address the fourth [factor] by revealing the degree to which the parody may
serve as a market substitute for the original or potentially licensed
derivatives.”186 Thus, by its very nature, “parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at
least enough of [the] original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable.”187
Once enough [of the original work] has been taken to assure
identification, how much more is reasonable will depend, say, on
the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose and character is
to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the
parody may serve as a market substitute for the original.188
Applying this factor to Whitmill, Warner Bros. took too much—the entire
tattoo. Further, the nontransformative use weighs against using any more of
the tattoo than necessary to make a parody.189
In other lawsuits, such as Allen, Escobedo and Reed, where athletes’ tattoos are
used as part of the athletes’ likenesses, a defendant has a slight chance of
success with a fair use defense. In Allen and Escobedo, the uses are also apart
from the tattoo bearers’ bodies190 because video game publishers and
distributors make digital reproductions of tattoo bearers, though they make
little or no changes to the tattoos, in order to present literal depictions of
athletes. Such uses may cut against finding a transformative use under fair use

Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
188 Id.
189 Even without relying on the parody/satire distinction, an analysis of the fair use factors
weighs against finding that Warner Bros.’ use of the tattoo is fair use. See Kathryn D. Piele,
Comment, Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.: What Is Fair Game for Parodists?, 18
LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 75, 99 (1997) (“The satire/parody distinction is unnecessary because the fourpronged fair use analysis will ferret out secondary works that merely highjack a copyrighted work
for no purpose other than to avoid creativity. For example, the first fair use prong requires a court
to look at whether the parody is transformative of the original work, which results in the creation
of a new work. Through this analysis, a court can lean toward disallowing fair use protection for a
parody that, instead of adding and building on the original work, merely uses the copyrighted work
to ‘avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.’ ” (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580)).
190 In Whitmill, Judge Perry pointed out that unlike in the first Hangover movie, the use of the
tattoo was disconnected from Tyson’s face in the sequel, and though it was prominently displayed
on the face of another actor throughout the movie, the display of the tattoo was insignificant to
the plot of the movie. Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 56.
186
187
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factor one,191 but defendants may be more successful in showing that the
amount of copying was reasonable under factor three in order to convey an
accurate representation of the athlete. Factor four, the effect upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work, could also pose an obstacle for
such defendants.192
In Reed, the tattoo was reproduced by computer simulation on the arm of
the athlete and was the focus of defendants’ television advertisement about the
meaning of the athlete’s tattoo, as opposed to an incidental display of the tattoo
as part of the athlete’s likeness. This type of use, arguably apart from the tattoo
bearer’s body, seems more transformative than an exact reproduction of the
likeness of an athlete and his tattoo, which would lean in favor of the
defendants.
Based on current third-party uses, factor one, the purpose and character of
the use, may not weigh in a defendant’s favor, unless the defendant can show
transformative use. Factor two, the nature of the copyrighted work, favors the
plaintiff if the work is a creative one and use of the work is minimally
transformative.193 Factor three “must be examined in context” to determine
whether “[t]he extent of the . . . copying” is consistent with or more than
necessary to further “the purpose and character of the use.”194 This factor
seems to weigh against finding fair use if the tattoo is used in its entirety and
not a transformative use. Factor four must also be determined in context, but it
191 Compare In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, Case No. 1015387, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013) (court, using the transformative test
derived from the first factor of copyright law for balancing the First Amendment and the right of
publicity, held that video game developer’s unauthorized use of athlete’s likeness in a video game
is not protected by the First Amendment because such use is not sufficiently transformative), with
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No. 09-56675, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15647 (9th Cir. July
31, 2013) (court, using a different test to balance the First Amendment and Lanham Act, held
that plaintiff could not assert a Lanham Act false endorsement claim based on the use of his
likeness in a line of video games because such use was protected by the First Amendment).
192 Plaintiff tattoo artists assert that there is harm to the potential market for their works.
Tattoo artist Christopher Escobedo stated that he would charge $50,000 to $200,000 to license a
tattoo copyright because copyright owners obtain similar licensing fees for the use of their music
during sporting events. Boudway, supra note 9.
193 Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir.
1998) (defendants conceded that “the scope of fair use is somewhat narrower for fictional works,
such as Seinfeld, than others,” and the court concluded that “[a]lthough this factor may be of less
(or even of no) importance when assessed in the context of certain transformative uses . . . the
fictional nature of the copyrighted work remains significant in the instant case, where the
secondary use is at best minimally transformative”).
194 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87.
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is difficult for a defendant to succeed on this factor without favorable evidence
about relevant markets.195
F. IMPLIED LICENSE

In Whitmill, Judge Perry concluded that “most importantly, there is no
evidence at all that Warner Bros. had any kind of a license implied or otherwise
to use the tattoo, and so Warner Brothers’ use of the tattoo was
unauthorized. . . .”196 She also noted that “until hearing about this movie, Mr.
Whitmill was not aware of any non-Tyson uses of the tattoo.”197 Thus, while
Whitmill impliedly licensed Mike Tyson’s use of the tattoo on his face in The
Hangover, The Hangover Part II, and various other media, he did not grant any
rights to third parties other than his client Tyson.198
While the Copyright Act requires that a transfer of copyright ownership199
be in writing, there is no writing requirement for an implied nonexclusive
license.200 An implied license “may be granted orally, or may even be implied
from conduct.”201 In Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit set forth a
three-prong test to determine when an implied nonexclusive license has been
granted: (1) licensor created the work at licensee’s request, (2) licensor delivered
the work to licensee, and (3) licensor intended that licensee copy and distribute
the work.202
The “touchstone” for finding an implied license is intent.203 In Asset Mktg.
Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, the Ninth Circuit expanded the three-prong test set forth in
Effects.204 The court reasoned that the last prong of the Effects test “is not

Id. at 590.
Hearing Transcript, supra note 11, at 56.
197 Id.
198 Id. (“The only use that Mr. Whitmill knew of this tattoo before this movie was all associated
with Mr. Tyson, and he had a contract with Mr. Tyson.”).
199 A “transfer of copyright ownership” is defined, in the Copyright Act, as “an assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright
or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The
definition expressly excludes a nonexclusive license. Id.
200 Id. § 204.
201 Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 41, § 10.03[A], at 10-36).
202 Id. at 559. The Effects test has been adopted by other courts, such as the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits. See I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 776; Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1235.
203 Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010).
204 Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2008).
195
196
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limited to copying and distribution.”205 Further, the relevant inquiry should
look to the intent of the parties—“the licensor’s objective intent at the time of
the creation and delivery” of the work “as manifested by the parties’
conduct.”206 Even an objective determination of intent requires a court to
speculate about what the licensor was thinking at the time of creation and
delivery of the work.207 In response to this problem, courts have examined
several factors to determine whether a licensor had the requisite intent to grant
an implied license to a party. The Seventh Circuit has reviewed “the language
of the copyright registration certificate, the letter agreement, and deposition
testimony; and the delivery of the copyrighted material without warning that its
further use would constitute copyright infringement.”208 The First Circuit has
considered:
(1) whether the parties were engaged in a short-term discrete
transaction as opposed to an ongoing relationship; (2) whether
the creator utilized written contracts . . . providing that
copyrighted materials could only be used with the creator’s future
involvement or express permission; and (3) whether the creator’s
conduct during the creation or delivery of the copyrighted
material indicated that use of the material without the creator's
involvement or consent was permissible.209
In the context of tattoos, the first two prongs of the Effects test are easily
met. The first prong—requiring the licensee to request creation of the work—
is satisfied when an individual requests a tattoo from the tattoo artist. The
second prong—creation and delivery of the work—is fulfilled when the tattoo
artist physically transfers the tattoo onto the individual’s body. Thus, the major
inquiry is the third element—the requirement that the licensor intend that the
licensee exploit one or more of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
As discussed in Parts III.D and III.G, the choice to permanently fix a work
on another’s human body, in and of itself, necessitates a diminution in the
205 Id.; see also Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 184 F. App’x 270, 276 (3d
Cir. 2006) (holding that the licensor “created the [work] with the intent that [it] would be used
and displayed by [the licensee]”).
206 Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc., 542 F.3d at 756.
207 Craig P. Bloom, Note, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo, Please, 31 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 435, 462 (2013).
208 I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 776.
209 Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41.
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exclusive rights of the copyright owner and some acknowledgment by the
copyright owner that there will be an inevitable exercise of some of these
exclusive rights by the tattoo bearer. The tattoo artist impliedly grants the
following rights to the tattoo bearer: the right of public display, the right to
make derivative works, but only to the extent required to make alterations for
the complete removal of the tattoo or the addition of a new tattoo to an
existing design,210 and limited rights of reproduction and distribution to the
extent necessary for the tattoo bearer to photograph himself and capture video
of himself (and to be photographed and recorded) during everyday life,
particularly for non-commercial purposes.211
An examination of the factors used to determine whether a licensor intends
to grant an implied license supports the conclusion that a court is likely to find a
tattoo bearer has the right to display and alter a tattoo on his body. Using the
relevant factors set forth by the Seventh Circuit, tattoo artists intend to at least
grant the right of public display. It is unlikely that a tattoo artist would warn a
tattoo bearer that any further use of the tattoo would constitute copyright
infringement. In fact, tattoo artists who have filed lawsuits alleging copyright
infringement of their tattoos conceded in their complaints that their athlete
clients had an implied license to publicly display the work in order to pursue a
livelihood in acting and sports.212 Regarding the existence of a letter agreement,
Mike Tyson executed a release acknowledging “that all artwork, sketches and
210 Bloom, supra note 207, at 463. Bloom opines that “[b]ehind every tattoo artist’s actions,
therefore, lies the intent to transfer specific rights that may be exercised during the normal course
of his life.” Id. at 464. Bloom’s use of the term “including” prior to identifying the types of
alternations seems to suggest that alterations other than the complete removal of the tattoo or
addition of a new tattoo to an existing design are the implied rights of the tattoo bearer. To the
extent he suggests other types of alterations are permissible, I disagree. The tattoo bearer has an
implied right to make derivative works only to remove the tattoo or add a new one.
211 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 537. Perzanowski observes from his interviews with tattoo
artists that they accept broad uses of copyrighted tattoos by their clients, namely, public display
and reproduction “of their bodies, whether by uploading images to their Facebook profiles,
submitting photos for publication in tattoo magazines, or even reproducing a picture of the tattoo
for commercial purposes.” Courts would likely determine that a tattoo artist intended to grant a
narrower implied license of reproduction and distribution to a tattoo bearer. The scope of the
license would depend, in part, on the identity of the tattoo bearer. For example, a non-celebrity’s
normal reproduction activities might be limited to taking “selfies” and photographs and videos
with family and friends and normal distribution activities might be sending photographs and
videos to family and friends and posting them on social media. In contrast, a celebrity’s or
professional athlete’s normal reproduction and distribution activities would be more extensive.
212 See Allen Complaint, supra note 4; Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10; Escobedo Complaint,
supra note 6.
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drawings related to [his] tattoo and any photographs of [his] tattoo” were the
property of tattoo artist S. Victor Whitmill.213 Ricky Williams signed a
document stating the artwork remained the property of tattoo artist Stephen
Allen unless otherwise expressed.214 Although both tattoo artists conceded that
their clients had a right to publicly display their tattoos in order to pursue their
livelihood, the parties had written agreements.
The application of the relevant factors of the First Circuit yields the same
result that tattoo artists intend to grant the right of public display to tattoo
bearers. The first factor—whether the parties were engaged in a short-term or
an ongoing relationship—weighs in favor of finding an implied license.215 The
relationship between a tattoo artist and his client is typically a short one, which
suggests that the tattoo artist does not intend to be involved with the work after
the client receives the tattoo, and therefore, some use is permissible without the
artist’s involvement.216 The second factor—whether the creator utilized written
contracts providing that copyrighted materials could only be used with the
creator’s future involvement or express permission—is similar to a Seventh
Circuit factor. In rare cases, a tattoo artist uses a written contract,217 and in only
one of the tattoo lawsuits did the contract require the express permission of the
artist for use of the tattoo.218 The absence of a written contract, likely in most
cases, also weighs in favor of an implied license.
The third factor—“whether the creator’s conduct during the creation or
delivery of the copyrighted material indicated that use of the material without
the creator’s involvement or consent was permissible”—is a fact-specific
inquiry.219 Even absent a determination on this factor, the other factors weigh
in favor of finding an implied license. However, while the scope of this license

Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 7.
Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 8, 28.
215 Bloom, supra note 207, at 465 (“Courts that have applied this analysis tend to find that a
long-term transaction cuts against the finding of an implied license. The courts reason that the
longer a relationship persists, the more likely a licensor intended to be involved in the project and
therefore would not have permitted use of the copyrighted work without his participation.
Conversely, a short-term and discrete transaction is indicative of intent to remain uninvolved,
making it more likely that a licensor granted use of the copyrighted work without his
involvement.”).
216 Id.
217 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 534–35 (“[S]igned agreements that contemplate copyright
ownership are practically unheard of in the tattoo industry.”).
218 Allen Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 8, 28.
219 Bloom, supra note 207, at 466 (“The conduct of a tattoo artist will no doubt vary with each
tattoo. Things like what was said and done during or after the tattoo transaction will matter.”).
213
214
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may encompass commercial use of the work, particularly for clients who are
athletes and celebrities, the license does not cover commercial uses by third
parties, or in instances like Reed, a client’s cooperation with third parties’
commercial use of a tattoo.220
In any event, implied licenses are generally revocable by the copyright
owner.221 Yet, an implied license supported by consideration is irrevocable and
constitutes a contract.222 The relevant inquiry in the context of tattoos is
whether consideration was given in exchange for use of the work.223 While
consideration is established when the tattoo bearer pays for the tattoo, it is
unknown whether the fee only serves as consideration for creating and applying
the design or whether it also covers an implied license to use the tattoo.224
Regardless, when an implied license is granted to a tattoo bearer covering the
use of the copyrighted work over the normal course of his life, the license is so
closely bound with the transaction that it becomes irrevocable.225 A client
would not pay for a tattoo design that he could not display, add to, or
remove.226
G. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Professor David Nimmer sets forth a list of purported impediments to the
recognition of copyright protection for tattoos in his declaration filed in
support of the defendants in Whitmill.227 Nimmer concluded that a claim for
copyright protection of a tattoo should be dismissed “if on no other basis than
220 Id. at 468 (“Recent cases suggest that the line is drawn at commercial use or when a tattoo
holder seeks to profit directly from the copyrighted tattoo. Nevertheless, it is evident that
commercial use is permitted by a tattoo holder’s implied license in certain situations, and never
permitted by third parties.”); Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 537 (“But under prevailing industry
norms, not all client uses are acceptable. Tattooers distinguish between uses of the tattoo as
applied to the body, which are universally accepted, and uses of the tattoo design as a work
disconnected from the body, which are subject to greater skepticism.”).
221 Bloom, supra note 207, at 470.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 470–71.
226 Id. at 471.
227 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 108, ¶ 20. Whitmill filed a motion to exclude David
Nimmer’s testimony on May 23, 2011, on the ground that such expert testimony was nothing
more than “thinly disguised legal argument and an attempt to circumvent the Court’s already
generous 40-page limit for Defendant’s brief.” See Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of
David Nimmer, ¶ 10, Whitmill, No. 4:11-CV-752. The court sustained Whitmill’s motion. Id.
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the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude and other badges of
slavery. . . .”228 While Nimmer incorrectly challenges copyrightability on the
basis of the Thirteenth Amendment,229 he raises legitimate constitutional
concerns about the enforceability of tattoo copyrights. He describes instances
where a court could require the destruction of a “work of visual art that may
gain ‘recognized stature,’ ” order laser removal of an unauthorized derivative
work tattooed elsewhere on Tyson’s body, or find violations of the copyright’s
display and performance right from Tyson’s magazine and television
appearances.230
Nimmer’s predictions are unlikely to come to fruition.231 Professor Aaron
Perzanowski addresses Nimmer’s arguments in his article Tattoos & IP Norms:
[C]opyright law offers courts many tools aside from the blunt
instrument of protectability that they could, and almost certainly
would, use to avoid this parade of horribles. These include
narrow readings of exclusive rights, fair use, first sale and related
exhaustion doctrines, implied license, and equitable discretion
over injunctive relief.232
Moreover, Professor Perzanowski observes that the most practical reason
for dismissing Nimmer’s concerns lies in the “norms of the tattoo industry.”233
Tattoo artists rarely sue their clients. Perzanowski notes Matthew Reed, the
tattoo artist who sued his client Rasheed Wallace for contributory copyright
infringement (if the court found Reed was the sole owner of the copyright) or
Nimmer Declaration, supra note 108, ¶ 16.
King, supra note 2, at 159 n.184 (“While Thirteenth Amendment concerns may be relevant
to the breadth of enforcement of a tattoo copyright, this Article fails to see the relevance to the
copyrightability of tattoos, particularly the useful articles’ limitation on copyrightability.”).
230 Nimmer Declaration, supra note 108, ¶ 20.
231 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 530 (identifying reasons “why Nimmer’s fears [are]
unwarranted”); see also Bloom, supra note 207, at 442 (“[A] tattoo holder retains the ability to move
freely during his life. While he may be restricted from displaying the copyrighted design in
various mediums, such as films, the tattoo holder is always given a choice. He can simply cover
up the tattoo design or appear in a way that does not show the tattoo. The element of choice is
ever-present, and the individual’s liberty is never truly restricted.”). While theoretically a tattoo
bearer may have a choice in how to display a tattoo, it is conceivable that a court could grant
remedies that would limit the tattoo bearer’s freedom to do display (or even modify or remove)
the tattoo. This Article agrees with Perzanowski’s conclusion that a court’s exercise of its
discretion will avoid such Thirteenth Amendment problems. Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 530.
232 Perzanowski, supra note 56, at 530.
233 Id.
228
229
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an accounting for any profits realized by Wallace in the exploitation of the
tattoo (if the court found Reed and Wallace were co-owners of the tattoo
copyright), “operated outside of the accepted norms of the tattoo industry.”234
However, Reed filed the lawsuit due to the “prominent use” of the tattoo in the
television advertisement, not Wallace’s public displays of it.235 As prominent
use of tattoo artists’ tattoos by third parties increases, it is likely that more tattoo
artists like Reed will (and should) seek to enforce their rights against such uses.
Such enforcement is distinguishable from instances where tattoo artists would
seek to enforce their rights against their customers solely based on their public
display of the tattoos.236 The latter enforcement is at odds with the tattoo
artists’ expectations of how their tattoos will be used by their customers.237
In his interviews with more than a dozen tattoo artists in the United States,
Perzanowski learned that tattoo artists acknowledge their clients’ rights to
publicly display their tattoos, reproduce images of their tattooed bodies, and
create new works that incorporate or destroy the tattoo artists’ original
designs.238 In sum, Perzanowski’s survey of the tattoo artists found that the
industry accepts a broad array of client uses of tattoos as applied to the body.239
However, the tattoo industry disfavors client uses of tattoos disconnected from
the body.240 Perzanowski predicts that these circumstances are more likely to
give rise to enforcement by tattoo artists.241 This Article not only concurs with
Perzanowski’s conclusion that tattoo artists may break from the industry norm
against litigation when such third party uses take place but also encourages
tattoo artists to enforce their rights against these uses.242 Tattoo artists’
copyright lawsuits have not gone to trial. As a result, companies like Warner
Brothers in Whitmill,243 may be emboldened by a lack of precedent on the
distribution, reproduction, and public display of tattoos in media.

234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

Id. at 532.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Whitmill Complaint, supra note 10.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A tattoo is often developed in collaboration between the tattoo artist and
the person seeking to purchase a tattoo. In many cases, the tattoo copyright
will be owned by the tattoo artist. However, the fluidity and informality of the
tattoo creation process generates ambiguities regarding ownership in some
circumstances. It is advisable for the tattoo artist and her customer to discuss
copyright ownership in the tattoo and reduce their agreement to writing.
Organizations with many tattoo-bearing members, such as the NFL Players
Association, have started recognizing the risk of leaving copyright ownership
and uses of copyrighted works undocumented.
Copyright ownership
agreements are not customary in the tattoo industry at this time, but instances
in which tattoo artists are asked to reduce an agreement to writing will become
more commonplace. Tattoo artists should be knowledgeable of the law and
prepared to negotiate an agreement that will protect their interests.
Enforcement of tattoo copyrights will be difficult. The artists’ choice of
medium will result in diminution of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owners. Tattoo artists should understand the need to relinquish some control
over their inked creations, and they already seem generally accepting of uses of
their works by tattoo bearers.
However, tattoo copyright owners must be vigilant in enforcing their rights
against non-client uses of their works. Tattoos have caught the attention of big
businesses seeking to market famous tattoo bearers as well as monetize tattoos
through media advertising. Such third party uses will become more prevalent
due to the growth in the popularity and visibility of tattoos, particularly among
celebrities and athletes. Uses by third-party companies have been and will
continue to be the catalyst for the filing of lawsuits by tattoo artists. Tattoo
artists should not face the same diminution of their rights in enforcement
efforts against such uses by parties outside of the tattoo artist-client
relationship.
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